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The Eurovision Song Contest provides a setting where Europeans can express their sen-
timents about other countries without regard to political sensitivities. Analyzing voting
data from the 25 contests between 1981-2005, we ¯nd strong evidence for the existence of
clusters of countries that systematically exchange votes regardless of the quality of their
entries. Cultural, geographic, economic and political factors are important determinants of
points awarded from one country to another. Other non-quality related factors such as order
of appearance, the language of the song and the gender of the performing artist, are also
important. There is also a substantial host country e®ect.
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One Saturday in May of every year millions of Europeans sit glued in front of their television
to watch one of the entertainment highlights of the year: the Eurovision Song Contest (ESC).
The contest has evolved from a humble, seven-country music festival that was ¯rst staged in
1956 to a glitzy extravaganza that is expected to include 40 participating countries in 2006 and
reach a potential audience of one billion people worldwide. Each country is represented in the
contest with one song and then votes for the best song among all other countries' entries. The
country-centered format of the ESC has turned it into a national contest where people root for
the country's entry in the same way that they root for their national football team.
For this reason, but also because musically the contest is mediocre at best, many people would
argue that the most exciting part of the ESC is not the singing but the voting. After all the songs
have been performed live on stage, the presenters get on the phone with a representative of each
participating country and the country's votes are read out. The procedure is suspenseful and
exciting. Eurovision bu®s are well aware of the fact that votes are not always cast on the basis
of a song's quality. Friendly countries always exchange votes, while no country expects to get
points from a country that it is not on good terms with, no matter the quality of the song. This
setup makes the ESC a fascinating experiment where each country can express its sentiments
about another without having to give regard to the political sensitivities and considerations that
usually accompany inter-governmental relations.
In our paper we use data from all contests between 1981-2005 to examine cultural, geographic,
political and economic factors as possible explanations of voting behavior that results in the
formation of voting blocks and social networks. Large and systematic di®erences in voting
patterns may re°ect, in addition to di®erences in tastes, some deeper sociological likes and
dislikes among nations. These systematic biases that go well beyond the aesthetic quality of
the song itself are captured by what we have identi¯ed as a±nity factors, that is variables that
measure how each country feels towards another country. We ¯nd that a±nity variables are
very important in the voting process. We also test for the presence and importance of other
1attributes in the song delivery such as the order of appearance, the language of the song and
the gender of the performing artist, as well as whether there is a bene¯t for the country hosting
the competition. These variables also turn out to be quite important in explaining voting
patterns. The econometric analysis is conducted in two ways. We ¯rst analyze the ordered
ranked preferences of each participant and then we proceed to examine the scores that each
participant gives to the other participating countries. Since the score data are censored we use
estimation methods that account for that.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present a brief history of the
ESC. We then proceed to present an overview of the existing literature followed by a description
of the voting patterns that govern the contest. The description of the data, the econometric
methodology used and the results from our analysis for di®erent speci¯cations that we tried are
presented in section ¯ve. Finally, in the next section we o®er some concluding remarks.
2 The Eurovision Song Contest
The (ESC) originates from a contest that ¯rst took place in 1956 under the name Eurovision
Grand Prix which, in turn, was modeled after the popular Italian San Remo Festival. The
¯rst contest took place in Lugano, Switzerland with only seven participants. The number of
participants has grown now to 39 in the 2005 competition on the 50th anniversary of the ESC.
The list of participants includes countries that do not belong geographically in Europe such as
Israel and Morocco, while many other non-European countries are petitioning to enter.1
The contest is run by the European Broadcasting Union, an association that is mostly com-
prised of European national television broadcasters. Although the speci¯c rules have changed
over the years, the basic format of the competition remains unchanged. Each national broad-
caster submits an entry that will represent the country in the contest. The selection process is
up to the broadcaster; the only restriction is it has to be an original song.2 On the night of the
1Armenia is scheduled to be the 40th participant in 2006.
2For many years there was also a restriction that the song had to be performed in one of the country's o±cial
languages. This was lifted because of complaints that it put some countries at a disadvantage, a view that is
2event the competing songs are performed live and then each country awards points to songs by
other countries. The country that earns the most points wins the contest and gets to host the
following year's event.
Irrespective of whether ESC actually contributes to the creation of better music in the
continent, the festival itself constitutes an example of a truly international forum where a country
can express an opinion about another country, free of political or economic considerations. The
awarding of points to songs goes beyond rewarding a \good" song, since in that case a good
song should receive the same number of votes from all other countries barring any major taste
di®erences. In addition to di®erences in tastes, some deeper sociological likes and dislikes among
nations that manifest themselves in systematic biased voting. If it were that all participants
were equally likely to produce good and bad songs then the distribution of votes from a certain
contestant to her fellow competitors should be more or less equal over time. Systematic biases
however, conceal the di®erent considerations beyond the aesthetic quality of the song itself that
enter the voting preferences of participant countries.
The basic structure of the voting system has been in place since 1975, whereby each voting
country awards points to ten other countries, itself not included. There have been various
changes over the years to the main format of the contest, the structure of the voting system, the
number of contestants and the character of the songs. The main changes that are important for
our analysis are as follows:
(i) In 1975 the current scoring system was introduced. Each country ranks the ten best songs.
The top-rated song gets 12 points, the second gets 10 and the next eight get 8, 7, 6, ..., 1.
(ii) An important change was the introduction of televoting. Up until 1997 each country's
votes were decided by a panel of experts. Televoting was allowed as an option in 1998 and
was soon adopted by all participating countries.
(iii) In order to accommodate more contestants the competition was split into two rounds in
2004. Countries with poor records in the contest have to compete in a qualifying round
supported by the results in this paper.
3which determines the songs that will compete in the main event. The countries involved
in the quali¯ers can vote in the ¯nal, but only those that reach the ¯nal can receive votes.
This allowed the total number of participants to increase from 24 in 2003 to 36 in 2004
and 39 in 2005.
3 Related literature
A network is a mechanism of exchanges between participants, whereby these exchanges may
represent information in the form of communication messages between workers (Gandal, King,
and Van Alstyne 2005) or scientists collaborating on a joint project (Newman 2003). In a typical
social network individuals are depicted as nodes and the links between the nodes represent
communication exchanges between these individuals. Over time new nodes and new links will
appear as new individuals enter the network and new collaborations are established. In the
context of the ESC a network can be established as exchange takes place between di®erent
countries in the form of points. The countries are the individual nodes and the connecting
links between these nodes represent the points exchanged between the countries. These edges or
connecting links can be directed, undirected, weighted and unweighted, depending on whether
these links are taking into account the direction of the vote from country A to country B or not,
as well as whether the number of points exchanged is accounted for in the depicted link or not.
The minimum degree of connectivity (number of connecting links) that a node (country) can
have in a given year of competition is ten, as each country assigns points to ten other countries.
The maximum degree is equal to the total number of the other contestants in that year because
the country can receive points from all other countries.
Fenn, Suleman, Efstathiou, and Johnson (2005) use complex dynamic networks to analyze
the voting patterns of the ESC in the period 1992 to 2003. The authors are able to uncover
nonlinear patterns that emerge over time that contradict the hypothesis that the ESC is a
random contest. In a random contest countries simply vote for the best song without any likes
or dislikes for the other contestants. If a country is equally capable of producing a good or
4bad song as any other country that would generate a pattern over time that would not di®er
from a random number generator simulating the results of the competition over time. Fenn et
al (2005) ¯nd this is not the case and there are patterns that are not compatible with random
behavior. In social networks two nodes that are connected to a third one are more likely to be
linked together as well, as someone's acquaintances are more likely to know and communicate
with each other. In the context of ESC, the same phenomenon may occur in the form of \voting
blocks" within the contest where there are clustering e®ects that di®er from the pattern that
would arise in a \random contest" environment.
Doosje and Alexander (2005) examined the issue of reciprocity in voting behavior between
countries in the ESC and concluded that countries give on average more points to countries from
who they tend to receive higher scores. In other words reciprocity between participant countries
over time acts as a catalyst for vote clustering. Bornhorst, Ichino, Karl, and Winter (2004) use
experimental data to look at the impact of cultural diversity on agents' choices of partners as
well as on the outcomes of economic interactions. In a dynamic trust game environment, where
subjects were divided between cultural lines, northern and southern Europeans, they show the
existence of cultural biases in the way agents conduct their economic activities. In the context of
the game northerners seem to be culturally biased against southerners, as they perceive them as
less trustworthy, where trust is measured by the tendency to reciprocate by making a generous
payback for a transfer received. The results are not due to stereotyping, since they emerge and
are reinforced by repeated interactions between di®erent nationalities even when agents are not
characterized by strong stereotyping at the outset of the interaction. Other examples of trust
games in the economic literature are Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) who examined the issue
of trust between Ashkenazi (Jews of European descent) and Sephardi (Jews of Middle Eastern
origin) Israelis, in the context of an one shot game. In general similar conclusions are reached by
Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2003) who ¯nd that trust di®erences between people of di®erent
countries a®ect the level of trade.
In the context of the ESC voting biases are the equivalent of transfer biases in the above
games. Cultural (trust) biases between countries (groups) would produce the same clustering
5e®ects that are predicted by a non-random contest environment. In this paper, we use the work
of Fenn et al (2005) on the formation of voting networks over time as a starting point. Our
intention is to o®er statistical evidence as to the factors that help create these networks, by
identifying the variables that help explain the voting preferences of the participant countries.
Ginsburgh and Noury (2004) and Haan, Dijkstra, and Dijkstra (2005) also examined di®erent
factors that a®ected voting behavior in the ESC. Ginsburgh and Noury (2004) looked at the
possible e®ect of vote trading or logrolling as opposed to an index of quality of their song,
whereas Haan, Dijkstra, and Dijkstra (2005) looked at the possible di®erences of the judging
behavior of expert juries as compared to that of the general public using the e®ect of the order
of appearance on the outcome of the vote in data sets from the ¯nals of the ESC as well as
those from national ¯nals. In the ESC until 1998 voting was conducted by expert juries whereas
in national competitions the public was typically more involved in the song selection. The
¯ndings of Ginsburgh and Noury (2004) ¯nd some evidence that language a®ects voting but
other measures of culture are either statistically insigni¯cant or very close to zero numerically.
Haan, Dijkstra, and Dijkstra (2005) ¯nd evidence that order of appearance has an e®ect on voting
although this e®ect is smaller for expert juries. In our paper using a data set that includes all
voting records between participants in the ESC for the period 1981-2005 we examine the link
between cultural, geographical and economic factors as possible explanations of the behavior
that results in the formation of possible voting blocks and social networks.
4 Voting patterns
We have collected voting data from all Eurovision song contests from 1981 to 2005.3 Each
contest featured 18-26 countries; a total of 39 countries have participated in the ESC in the
period under examination.4 There are a total of 656 country pairs that are observed between 1
and 25 times; only Spain, Sweden and the UK participated in all 25 contests.
3The data are readily available at the o±cial ESC website (http://www.eurovision.tv) as well as various
websites maintained by ESC a¯cionados (e.g. http://www.kolumbus.fi/jarpen/ and http://www.esctoday.
com).
4For the years 2004 and 2005 we use the countries that participated in the ¯nal round only.
6The ¯rst thing to do is to look at the mean number of points awarded between di®erent
countries and look for country pairs that exhibit \abnormal" voting behavior. In order to set
a benchmark suppose that song quality is randomly determined every year. Each country gets
a draw from the same distribution so that expected song quality is the same for all countries.
Each country gives out a total of 58 (= 12 + 10 + 8 + 7 + 6 + 5 + 4 + 3 + 2 + 1) points and also
expects to receive, on average 58 points. In a contest with N participants, the expected number
of points received per participant is 58=(N ¡ 1). Given that the median contest size is 23 and
assuming random song quality, we expect that each country will receive from each other roughly
58=22 = 2:64 points.
In order to compare this with our data we calculated the mean number of points awarded
between the members of each pair in our sample. In Table 1 we present the pairs with the highest
and lowest averages; we excluded pairs that appear fewer than three times. Column (4) reports
the mean number of points awarded from country A to country B while column (5) reports
the mean number of points awarded in the opposite direction. We see that many countries
systematically give to speci¯c other countries many more points than the 2.64 we expect on
average. At the same time, those countries also receive a lot of points from the countries they
give to. The correlation between columns (4) and (5) is .8757. Give and thou shalt receive?
Perhaps.
In reality, of course, song quality is not random. Some countries have stronger musical
traditions or more mature entertainment industries and are able to consistently produce above
average songs. In columns (6) and (7) we present the mean number of points received by each
country from all other countries. To ensure comparability we took this mean over contests that
included both countries. Looking at the ¯rst entry in the table, in the 18 contests that both
Cyprus and Greece competed, each country averaged 2.2 points. Yet Cyprus gave Greece an
average of 10.9 points and received an average of 10.1. The di®erence between 10.9 and 2.2 is
the \overgiving" from Cyprus to Greece after controlling (crudely) for song quality. Cyprus has
given to Greece an average of 8.7 points more than the average Greece has received from all
other countries. Greece and Cyprus are the most extreme example, but it is clear from the table
7Table 1: Pairs with the highest and lowest point exchanges
Mean points awarded \Overgiving"
Country A Country B Obs. A to B B to A all to A all to B A to B B to A
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
I love you:
Cyprus Greece 18 10.9 10.1 2.2 2.2 7.9 8.7
Slovakia Malta 3 11.3 6.7 0.3 4.4 6.4 6.9
Ukraine Russia 3 8.7 7.3 2.9 2.6 4.4 6.1
Estonia Latvia 4 9.3 8.5 4.5 3.4 4.0 5.9
Finland Estonia 5 8.4 4.4 0.6 2.7 3.8 5.7
Croatia FYRMacedonia 5 6.6 8.0 2.8 1.0 5.2 5.6
Turkey Bosnia 10 6.5 4.6 2.8 1.4 1.8 5.1
Croatia Bosnia 11 6.5 6.1 2.3 1.4 3.8 5.1
Denmark Sweden 20 8.2 6.1 3.0 3.8 3.1 4.4
Slovenia Croatia 9 7.1 5.0 1.5 2.8 3.5 4.3
Romania FYRMacedonia 5 5.0 5.2 1.7 1.1 3.5 3.9
Germany Poland 8 5.8 4.3 2.9 1.9 1.4 3.9
Estonia Sweden 9 7.0 5.9 3.4 3.6 2.5 3.4
Norway Sweden 24 7.1 4.7 2.5 3.7 2.2 3.4
Norway Denmark 19 6.6 3.9 2.3 3.2 1.6 3.4
Cyprus Serbia 12 6.6 4.7 2.6 3.4 2.1 3.2
Romania Russia 6 5.3 5.0 1.9 3.3 3.1 2.0
Croatia Malta 13 6.3 4.8 2.6 3.3 2.2 3.0
Sweden Iceland 17 4.9 5.5 3.7 1.9 1.8 3.0
Romania Greece 6 6.0 3.8 1.8 3.2 2.0 2.8
I love you not:
Romania Latvia 4 0.0 0.0 2.9 4.4 -2.9 -4.4
Croatia Sweden 13 0.5 0.5 2.8 3.8 -2.3 -3.3
Turkey Latvia 5 1.2 0.0 3.1 3.6 -3.1 -2.4
Denmark Croatia 8 0.0 1.5 3.7 2.8 -2.2 -2.8
Malta France 15 0.2 2.0 3.7 2.9 -1.7 -2.7
Correlations: .8757 -.0328 .9527
8that overgiving occurs between other countries also. In the bottom part of the table we see pairs
of countries that do not give many points to each other. There are sone notable di®erences here
also although they are not as large because 2.64 is much closer to zero than it is to 12. Note that
controlling for quality has actually increased the correlation to a striking .9527. Going beyond
simply looking at country pairs, just reading out loud the names of the countries that appear
in Table 1 gives some clues of more interesting behavior. Countries in Scandinavia, the Balkans
and eastern Europe dominate the table. Croatia appears six times, Sweden ¯ve, Romania four,
Estonia and Latvia three. Lots of points are exchanged within three clusters: nordic countries;
balkan countries; and countries hailing from the former Soviet Union.
A helpful way of displaying voting alliances is through the use of network graphs. In Figure
1 we display such a graph.5 Countries were arranged in approximate geographical position with
such adjustments made to make the patterns clearer and keep the graph size small. A connecting
link from country A to country B was drawn if country A gave to country B at least 6.1 points
(the mean plus two standard deviations) on average over all contests they both participated in.
From the ¯gure we can discern certain network clusters that mimic the geographic positions of
the countries involved. These separate clusters include the nordic group of countries (Sweden,
Finland, Norway, Denmark, Iceland and Estonia); the former Soviet republics (Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine); and the former Yugoslav republics (Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Slovenia, Serbia & Montenegro).
5 Econometric analysis
5.1 Conceptual framework
The basic problem faced by each country is to identify and rank the ten best songs in a contest.
Our basic modeling assumption is that this decision will depend on two factors: a±nity that
each country feels towards each other country and the perceived quality of each song. The latter
5The graph was created using the NetDraw program which is part of the UCINET package. We are grateful
to Neil Gandal for pointing us to this literature.
9Figure 1: Network graph depicting overgiving
can be further decomposed into objective quality that relates to observable song attributes and
subjective quality that relates to a country's idiosyncratic preferences for a certain type of song.
In order to be concrete, let aij denote the a±nity between country i and country j. The
quality of country j's entry as perceived by country i is denoted by qij = µj+"ij, where µj denotes
objective song attributes and "ij denotes country i's idiosyncratic preference for country j's song.
The overall valuation of each song amounts to a mapping from these three factors to an one-
dimensional index vij = f(aij;µj;"ij). The songs are then ranked: the song j with the highest
vij is ranked 1st (RANKij = 1), the next one 2nd (RANKij = 2), and so on up to the 10th
song. The remaining songs are not ranked. RANKij is then translated into points POINTSij
as described above. Thus variable POINTSij takes values in f0;1;2;3;4;5;6;7;8;10;12g and
variable RANKij takes values in f1;2;3;4;5;6;7;8;9;10;:g, where a dot \." signi¯es entries that
10are not ranked. RANKij is the natural dependent variable to use but is also cumbersome and
di±cult to interpret. For that reason we will rely mostly on speci¯cations that use POINTSij
as the dependent variable.
We parameterize a±nity and objective quality as aij =
P
l ¯l xijl and µj =
P
m °m wjm








°m wjm + "ij: (1)
5.2 Explanatory variables
Our goal is to determine the factors the determine a±nity aij and perceived quality qij and
the relative importance of each in determining the outcome of the voting process. A useful
point of reference is the gravity model that has been used extensively in the international trade
literature to model trade °ows between countries.6 In a typical speci¯cation the variable to
be explained is the amount of exports from country A to country B. Explanatory variables
include size, geographic proximity and variables that aim to capture cultural, religious and
political links between the two countries; in short, variables that capture a±nity. In our case
the dependent variable will be the number of points given by country A to country B (or the
rank assigned to it). Our choice of explanatory variables was guided by the gravity equation
literature. One notable di®erence is that we use trade °ows (the dependent variable in the
gravity equation) as an independent variable to capture the closeness of economic relations
between the two countries. We de¯ned two trade variables; EXPORTS for the pair (A,B)
is the percentage of country A's exports that went to country B in 1994; TOTTRADE is
the sum of the values of the EXPORTS variables for the two countries in each pair; that is,
TOTTRADEij = TOTTRADEji = EXPORTSij + EXPORTSji. TOTTRADE captures
overall importance of trade between the two countries while EXPORTS captures asymmetric
6Anderson (1979) provides a theoretical justi¯cation for the gravity model; Leamer and Levinsohn (1995)
review the empirical literature.
11e®ects that may arise from exports as opposed to imports.7
In order to capture geographic closeness we created the variable PROXIMITY, de¯ned as the
negative of the distance between airports in capital cities unless the countries have a common
border in which case PROXIMITY was set to zero. In that case we capture the pure neigh-
borhood e®ect that is not contaminated by a case where the capitals are far apart in distance,
yet the countries have common borders.8 In order to capture the e®ect of a common language
we created two dummy variables. MAINLANG takes the value of 1 if the main language of the
two countries is the same (e.g. Germany and Austria, Greece and Cyprus). ANYLANG takes
the value of 1 if the two countries have any one common language, even if it is not the main
one (e.g. Italy and Switzerland get a 0 for MAINLANG and a 1 for ANYLANG). The variable
ANYRELIG was de¯ned in the same way as ANYLANG to capture similarities in religious
beliefs.
We also collected data on several observable characteristics that may be thought to impact
a song's perceived quality. One thing we can not measure is pure artistic quality.9 What we can
do is test various conjectures that have been circulating in Eurovision circles.10 For example, it
is widely thought that the language that the song is written in is important; speci¯cally, songs in
\strange" languages are at a disadvantage. We construct two dummy variables, ENGLISH and
FRENCH to identify songs written in those two languages. Female performers are said to do
better than males; the dummy variables SOLOMALE and SOLOFEMALE aim to capture that
e®ect. We also include a variable named DUET to capture di®erential e®ects of dues versus
larger groups. Order of appearance is also rumored to be important; the variables FIRST3
and LAST3 identify the ¯rst three and last three songs in order of appearance. Finally, the
hosting country typically does better than average, so we include the dummy HOST which
7We selected an indicative year in order to reduce the data collection burden. It should be a su±ciently good
proxy for our purposes. Trade data came from the IMF's Direction of Trade Statistics database.
8Distances were obtained from the distance calculator at http://www.etn.nl. Country pairs with common
borders, language and religion were identi¯ed from information given in The CIA Factbook, http://www.cia.
gov/cia/publications/factbook.
9A cynic would say that such a measure would take the value of zero for all entries and thus would not be
identi¯ed.
10The webmaster of http://www.kolumbus.fi/jarpen/ lists some of these conjectures and provides supporting
evidence using data from winning entries only.
12Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std dev. Min. Max.
POINTS 2.677 3.675 0 12
EXPORTS 0.028 0.051 0 0.389
TOTTRADE 0.056 0.077 0 0.448
ANYRELIG 0.358 0.479 0 1
ANYLANG 0.222 0.415 0 1
PROXIMITY -4.634 1.509 -6.268 0
HOST 0.042 0.2 0 1
ENGLISH 0.271 0.444 0 1
FRENCH 0.12 0.325 0 1
FIRST3 0.132 0.338 0 1
LAST3 0.132 0.338 0 1
SOLOMALE 0.267 0.442 0 1
SOLOFEMALE 0.441 0.496 0 1
DUET 0.126 0.332 0 1
NORDIC 0.033 0.18 0 1
SOVIET 0.005 0.073 0 1
YUGOSLAV 0.007 0.084 0 1
PASTGIVING 0.515 2.091 -7.33 11.9
PASTGIVSQ 4.639 11.55 0 142.1
takes the value one if the receiving country hosts the competition. These are variables that can
be construed as packaging e®ects of the song delivery. The ¯rst three are variables where the
performing country has a choice in a®ecting the delivery of its song by choosing the artist and
the language of delivery, whereas the last three variables capture the exogenous characteristics
of the song delivery which are beyond the performer's control. Table 2 provides descriptive
statistics for all the variables used in the analysis.
5.3 Estimation and results
Our data are essentially an unbalanced panel of partial rankings by each participant of all other
participants. Such data are not common in economics and we will draw on techniques developed
in sociology in order to analyze them.11 An observation in our data is uniquely de¯ned by the
triple giver-receiver-year. We note that every country pair appears twice in each year. For
11See Allison and Christakis (1994) and Marden (1995).
13example, the pair (A,B) appears once when A gives to B and once when B gives to A. Thus in
a contest with Nt participants we have Nt ¢ (Nt ¡ 1) observations. A total of 656 country pairs
appear in all; the total number of observations we work with is 12,151.
The rank-ordered logit speci¯cation, also known in the literature as exploded logit and
as the Plackett-Luce model (Marden 1995), is the appropriate method to use in the context
of a contest with many participants, where some of these participants will be ranked. The
method was proposed in the econometrics literature by Beggs, Cardell, and Hausman (1981)
and further re¯ned Hausman and Ruud (1987) who also coined the name rank-ordered logit.
Note that there is more than one ranked participant as voting does not simply pick the best
among the contestants but also ranks the rest in the group of alternatives. This is di®erent
than the standard ordered logit or probit speci¯cations, where one chooses one among many
alternatives. The rank-ordered logit has a sequential interpretation. One ¯rst chooses the best
among all participants (assigns the maximum vote of 12). Next, the voting country selects the
best alternative among the remaining alternatives and the process continues in that way. The
decisions at each stage of the decision making process are described by a standard ordered probit
or logit model.12 Note that the model also accounts for censoring as only the top ten alternatives
are ranked among more than twice as many contestants. The method of estimation is maximum
likelihood (Beggs, Cardell, and Hausman 1981).13
A unique aspect of our data is that we have repeated rankings by the same contestants. The
entries that each contestant has to rank di®er from year to year but also have common elements
(the a±nity aspect). We are not aware of any previous work that uses the rank-ordered logit
in a similar setting. In order to keep the likelihood function tractable we make the simplifying
assumption that there is no link between rating countries in di®erent years. In other words,
France in 1985 is a di®erent country than France in 1986. This means that we can not fully
12Ginsburgh and Noury (2004) used a ordered probit model as a way of checking the robustness of their results,
whereas Haan, Dijkstra, and Dijkstra (2005) used linear OLS methods to analyze the rankings.
13The implementation of the maximum likelihood estimator is obtained as the partial likelihood estimator of
an appropriate Cox regression model for waiting time (Allison and Christakis 1994). In this case, higher values
of an alternative is equivalent to a higher hazard rate of failure. In other words a higher stated preference is
represented by a shorter waiting time until failure.
14exploit the panel aspect of our data. The basic model that we estimate is
RANKijt = f(xij;wjt;µ) (2)
where vector xij includes variables that capture a±nity between countries i and j, wjt includes
characteristics of entry j and µ is the parameter vector to be estimated. Note that xij has no t
subscript as all our a±nity variables are time-invariant.
The rank-ordered logit has the disadvantage that the results do not have a natural inter-
pretation. For this reason we also estimated an alternative speci¯cation using POINTSit as
the dependent variable. We treat POINTSit as a continuous variable and apply the Tobit
correction to account for censoring. The basic speci¯cation is:14
POINTSijt = ® + x0
ij¯ + w0
jt° + "ijt (3)
In Table 3 we present the results of our base speci¯cation using four methods: the rank-
ordered logit, the simple tobit, the ¯xed-e®ects panel tobit and the random e®ects panel tobit. In
all cases the set of a±nity variables are very important in explaining voting behavior. EXPORTS,
TOTTRADE MAINLANG, and MAINRELIG are statistically signi¯cant and positively a®ect
the votes that one country gives to another. This is of course in line with the argument that
cultural a±nity plays a very strong role in a®ecting exchange behavior expressed in the formation
of networks as argued by Fenn et al (2005). PROXIMITY also has a positive impact that is
statistically signi¯cant but less so than in the case of the other variables. This suggests that
geographic proximity is less important than cultural factors. The a±nity variables do not appear
important only in the case of the ¯xed e®ects speci¯cation (except for EXPORTS) as the latter
are another way of capturing the time-invariant characteristics embodied in the a±nity variables.
From Table 3 it is also evident that the factors that a®ect the presentation of the song
14Ginsburgh and Noury (2004) used the observation of the pair indexed by the giving country as that of the
dependent variable, but included the observation where the same country is a receiver as a regressor to capture
possible voting exchange or reciprocity among the members of the pair. That introduces endogeneity in the
estimation that needs to be accounted for by the use of instrumental variables.
15Table 3: Results from the base speci¯cation
Variables Rank- Panel tobit
ordered Pooled random ¯xed
logit tobit e®ects e®ects
EXPORTS -0.270 6.519¤¤ 5.159¤ 6.013¤¤
(-0.664) (-1.975) (-2.241) (-1.843)
TOTTRADE 1.211¤ 2.389y 5.274¤¤ 11.3
(-0.592) (-1.45) (-1.614) (-21.2)
ANYRELIG 0.177¤¤ 0.840¤¤ 0.611¤¤ -1.527
(-0.038) (-0.156) (-0.169) (-4.202)
ANYLANG 0.065 0.563¤¤ 0.570¤¤ 1.496y
(-0.040) (-0.175) (-0.192) (-0.768)
PROXIMITY 0.034¤ 0.139¤ 0.141¤ 1.745y
(-0.014) (-0.058) (-0.063) (-0.968)
HOST 0.534¤¤ 3.185¤¤ 2.615¤¤ 2.540¤¤
(-0.061) (-0.319) (-0.298) (-0.302)
ENGLISH 0.542¤¤ 1.576¤¤ 1.054¤¤ 1.453¤¤
(-0.047) (-0.157) (-0.155) (-0.172)
FRENCH 0.020 0.230 0.844¤¤ 0.633¤
(-0.046) (-0.217) (-0.231) (-0.259)
FIRST3 -0.160¤¤ -0.803¤¤ -0.783¤¤ -0.900¤¤
(-0.042) (-0.205) (-0.191) (-0.193)
LAST3 0.192¤¤ 0.956¤¤ 0.890¤¤ 0.997¤¤
(-0.039) (-0.199) (-0.185) (-0.189)
SOLOMALE -0.147¤¤ -0.622¤¤ -0.584¤¤ -0.521¤
(-0.045) (-0.215) (-0.201) (-0.206)
SOLOFEMALE 0.206¤¤ 1.036¤¤ 1.124¤¤ 1.221¤¤
(-0.042) (-0.198) (-0.185) (-0.189)
DUET 0.237¤¤ 1.504¤¤ 1.294¤¤ 1.374¤¤
(-0.051) (-0.251) (-0.235) (-0.24)
INTERCEPT -1.494¤¤ 0.382 7.26
(-0.379) (-0.402) (-6.511)
Obs. 12,151 12,151 12,151 12,151
lnL -15,475 -22,844 -23,192 -21,971
Â2 520.24 606.81 525.62 2352.57
½ 0.145
(s.e.) (0.008)
Standard errors in parentheses.
Signi¯cance levels: y : 10%, ¤ : 5%, ¤¤ : 1%.
16(packaging e®ects) are also very important. If the language of performance is ENGLISH, the
song has a de¯nite advantage over a performance in another language. What we found striking
is the fact that the order of appearance is very important in how a song is judged. Participants
that perform last (the last three positions in the order of appearance) do signi¯cantly better
on average than those who perform ¯rst, even though the order of appearance is determined
randomly, con¯rming the ¯ndings of Haan, Dijkstra, and Dijkstra (2005). One possible argument
for this result is that presence of a \fading memory e®ect", where jurors seem to better remember
the performance of the later contestants and fail to recall as well those who have performed
earlier. The HOST country receives about three extra points from each participant. We think
that at least two factors contribute to this large impact. One is that the host is rewarded for
going through the trouble of \putting up the show". The second is that the host country invests
more heavily in the contest because it wants to make a strong showing on its home turf.15 A
similar host country e®ect was obtained by Bernard and Busse (2004) in their study of medals
won in Olympic Games. Finally, the presence of female artists gives an advantage to the song
of the country in question by more than one point on average, indicating a certain bias of jurors
or of the voting public towards female performers. Duets also seem to be better appreciated by
voters than larger groups.
The results are qualitatively very similar across speci¯cations. In the remainder of the
analysis we present results using the panel tobit model which is more °exible and a®ords a
natural interpretation of estimated coe±cients as points.
One possible criticism of our base speci¯cations is that the variables measuring trade volumes
are endogenous. Indeed, the whole point of the gravity model is to explain trade °ows using
our other independent variables. Including trade °ows in the model may be soaking up some
of the impact of other factors. To test for this we re-estimated the model without the trade
variables. We report the results in column 2 of Table 4, alongside the results from the base
speci¯cation which we reproduce in column 1 to facilitate comparisons. Removing the trade
variables naturally leads to a lower maximal point on the likelihood function while it also in-
15Greece, the host of the 2006 ESC, has just announced that it has recruited Anna Vissi, the country's most
successful performer over the last 20 years, to represent the country in this year's contest.
17Table 4: Results from alternative speci¯cations
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
EXPORTS 5.159¤ 5.055¤ 4.01y 3.957y
(-2.241) (2.207) (2.29) (2.259)
TOTTRADE 5.274¤¤ 6.393¤¤ 6.97¤¤ 7.818¤¤
(-1.614) (1.599) (1.673) (1.66)
RELIGION 0.611¤¤ 0.795¤¤ 0.511¤¤ 0.433¤ 0.291
(-0.169) (0.167) (0.173) (0.178) (0.182)
LANGUAGE 0.570¤¤ 0.599¤¤ 0.241 0.618¤¤ 0.302
(-0.192) (0.191) (0.192) (0.198) (0.200)
PROXIMITY 0.141¤ 0.333¤¤ -0.002 0.024 -0.09
(-0.063) (0.056) (0.065) (0.068) (0.069)
HOST 2.615¤¤ 2.622¤¤ 2.618¤¤ 2.498¤¤ 2.492¤¤
(-0.298) (0.298) (0.298) (0.310) (0.310)
ENGLISH 1.054¤¤ 1.071¤¤ 1.067¤¤ 0.875¤¤ 0.896¤¤
(-0.155) (0.155) (0.155) (0.162) (0.162)
FRENCH 0.844¤¤ 0.924¤¤ 1.058¤¤ 0.686¤¤ 0.903¤¤
(-0.231) (0.230) (0.230) (0.240) (0.24)
FIRST3 -0.783¤¤ -0.761¤¤ -0.747¤¤ -0.877¤¤ -0.846¤¤
(-0.191) (0.191) (0.191) (0.201) (0.201)
LAST3 0.890¤¤ 0.885¤¤ 0.886¤¤ 0.675¤¤ 0.671¤¤
(-0.185) (0.185) (0.185) (0.199) (0.199)
SOLOMALE -0.584¤¤ -0.596¤¤ -0.579¤¤ -0.468¤ -0.449¤
(-0.201) (0.201) (0.201) (0.219) (0.219)
SOLOFEMALE 1.124¤¤ 1.119¤¤ 1.128¤¤ 1.114¤¤ 1.122¤¤
(-0.185) (0.185) (0.185) (0.201) (0.201)
DUET 1.294¤¤ 1.293¤¤ 1.259¤¤ 1.297¤¤ 1.257¤¤











INTERCEPT 0.382 1.634¤¤ -0.532 -0.524 -1.239¤¤
(-0.402) (0.353) (0.412) (0.437) (0.444)
Obs. 12,151 12,151 12,151 10,849 10,849
lnL -23,192 -23,211 -23,151 -20,733 -20,696
Â2 525.62 475.67 596.75 458.35 522.76
½ 0.145 0.149 0.129 0.118 0.106
(s.e.) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
All speci¯cations are estimated using a random-e®ects tobit model. Standard errors are
in parentheses. Signi¯cance levels: y : 10%, ¤ : 5%, ¤¤ : 1%.
18creases the magnitude and signi¯cance of the coe±cients on the a±nity variables. In particular,
the coe±cient on PROXIMITY more than doubles in size. Clearly the trade variables were
picking up some of the impact of geographical factors in determining points awarded.
In the descriptive section of the paper we identi¯ed some groups of countries that seem
to exchange a lot of points with each other. In order to formally test our conjectures we
de¯ned three clusters of countries: NORDIC, including Sweden, Finland, Norway, Denmark,
Iceland and Estonia; SOVIET, including countries that used to be part of the Soviet union
(Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine); and YUGOSLAV, including countries
that comprised former Yugoslavia (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Slovenia,
Serbia & Montenegro). The three dummy variables (taking the value of 1 if both countries
belong to the cluster) were added as explanatory variables in the random-e®ects tobit regressions.
Column 3 of Table 4 presents the results with the addition of the geographical clusters. For
example the variable NORDIC indicates that a country in the group is likely to receive on
average an additional two and a half points from another country in the group relative to what
it would receive from other countries, regardless of song quality, whereas the case for SOVIET
and YUGOSLAV are even more dramatic. Adding the cluster indicators removes signi¯cance
from the other variables, particularly PROXIMITY as can be seen from comparing columns 1
and 3 of Table 4.
Our a±nity variables explain a lot of the variation in point-giving but fail to capture two
aspects that may be important. Because they are all time-invariant, we do not capture any
intertemporal changes in a±nity. For example, Greece and Turkey exchanged a total of 20
points between them in 14 contests up to 1999. In that year relations between the two countries
improved dramatically as they helped each other when they were successively hit by earthquakes.
In the ¯ve contests that followed they exchanged a total of 54 points. Our a±nity variables also
do a poor job capturing asymmetries in a±nity. This is because all but one of the variables in
vector x take the same value regardless of the direction of giving. The only exception is the
exports variable which takes di®erent values in each direction: EXPORTSij 6= EXPORTSji.
One way to account for asymmetry in a±nity is to use voting data from past contests.
19We de¯ne the variable PASTGIVING to be the over-giving by the giver to the receiver in all
previous contests; that is, the di®erence between the mean number of points that the receiver
has obtained from the giver in the past and what it had received on average from all other
countries. This variable also captures any other factors that determine a±nity in a symmetric
fashion but we did not account for. The last two columns of Table 4 present the results with
PASTGIVING and its square with and without the cluster indicators. PASTGIVING and its
square are very signi¯cant and indicate that historical asymmetries in one country's average
voting behavior, when compared with the historical average of everyone else follow a nonlinear
(convex) pattern whereby they get exacerbated the greater they are. Clearly, past asymmetric
behavior strongly a®ecting present voting goes well beyond a voting rule that rewards \artistic
quality" and strongly points to the presence of networks with strong cultural ties that withstand
time. Note also that the last column dominates in terms of ¯t (value of the log-likelihood
function) as well as statistical speci¯cation, since the tests of joint statistical signi¯cance for
various subsets of variables such as the cluster indicators and the PASTGIVING and its square
have zero probability values.
Juries of experts versus public opinion
Among the main important institutional changes in the ESC is the introduction of televoting
in 1998. Table 5 presents the results of the model which is subjected to a structural break in
1998.16 The model includes all the variables that we had earlier as well as their interactions
with the break dummy that takes the value one for observations after and including 1998. We
present two versions, one that includes PASTGIVING and one that does not. In both cases the
interacting variables are jointly signi¯cant signifying the importance of the break with a zero
probability value. All a±nity variables are more important in the post-1998 period than before.
This suggests that the public is more likely than juries of experts to take their biases into account
when they cast their vote. The host country and order of appearance e®ects are also much larger
16We also considered 1992 as a possible date for a structural break as this was the year that many new countries
from the SOVIET and YUGOSLAV clusters of countries entered the competition. However, the results suggest
that it is 1998 that clearly presented a signi¯cant break.
20Table 5: Test of structural break in 1998
Variables pre-1998 post-1998 pre-1998 post-1998
EXPORTS 7.087¤¤ -7.638y 5.687¤ -6.067
(2.599) (3.926) (2.710) (4.079)
TOTTRADE 3.272y 4.761y 3.455y 6.741¤
(1.907) (2.848) (2.001) (3.008)
ANYRELIG 0.217 0.447 0.145 0.257
(0.207) (0.308) (0.223) (0.328)
ANYLANG -0.296 2.054¤¤ -0.34 2.246¤¤
(0.224) (0.350) (0.235) (0.366)
PROXIMITY 0.071 0.387¤¤ 0.05 0.191
(0.079) (0.116) (0.084) (0.126)
HOST 1.206¤¤ 2.467¤¤ 0.956¤ 2.778¤¤
(0.363) (0.649) (0.382) (0.669)
ENGLISH 4.253¤¤ -3.796¤¤ 3.938¤¤ -3.574¤¤
(0.284) (0.361) (0.299) (0.380)
FRENCH 1.521¤¤ -2.241¤¤ 1.251¤¤ -1.934¤¤
(0.256) (0.494) (0.268) (0.513)
FIRST3 -0.819¤¤ -0.143 -1.010¤¤ 0.201
(0.233) (0.406) (0.249) (0.423)
LAST3 0.476¤ 1.115¤¤ -0.090 1.995¤¤
(0.227) (0.394) (0.247) (0.417)
SOLOMALE -0.062 -1.256¤¤ 0.230 -1.576¤¤
(0.257) (0.412) (0.288) (0.445)
SOLOFEMALE 1.522¤¤ -0.891¤ 1.509¤¤ -0.829¤
(0.232) (0.382) (0.260) (0.409)
DUET 1.663¤¤ -0.932y 1.753¤¤ -1.004y





INTERCEPT 0.071 1.647¤ -0.140 0.291






All speci¯cations are estimated using a random-e®ects tobit model. Standard
errors are in parentheses. Signi¯cance levels: y : 10%, ¤ : 5%, ¤¤ : 1%.
21Table 6: Unbiased rankings
Actual contest Counterfactual controlling for:
ranking and points only a±nity and
a±nity characteristics
1998 contest
1 Israel 172 Israel Israel
2 UK 166 Malta Belgium
3 Malta 165 UK Netherlands
4 Netherlands 150 Netherlands Croatia
5 Croatia 131 Belgium Malta
6 Belgium 122 Croatia Sweden
7 Germany 86 Norway Portugal
8 Norway 79 Germany Norway
9 Ireland 64 Ireland UK
10 Sweden 53 Sweden Germany
2004 contest
1 Ukraine 280 Serbia & Mont. Ukraine
2 Serbia & Mont. 263 Ukraine Serbia & Mont.
3 Greece 252 Greece Cyprus
4 Turkey 195 Turkey Sweden
5 Cyprus 170 Cyprus Greece
6 Sweden 170 Sweden Turkey
7 Albania 106 Spain Spain
8 Germany 93 Germany Croatia
9 Bosnia 91 Bosnia-Herz. France
10 Spain 87 Poland Germany
in the post-1998 period. On the other hand, the e®ect of language is reversed after 1998. We
think that this is a spurious result re°ecting the fact that some of the recent winners did not use
english even though most other countries did. The e®ect of female performers seems to only be
important in the pre-1998 era and is reversed after that. More importantly, the PASTGIVING
variables are insigni¯cant in the post-1998 era. This is a direct implication of the fact that all
the other variables explain a lot more during this period.
22Unbiased rankings
An interesting counterfactual experiment is to use the estimated model to construct alternative
rankings after the various sources of bias have been controlled for. We performed this calculation
for two contests, 1998 and 2004, which were selected because the voting was close.17 Table 6
presents the top ten ranked countries according to our counterfactual which are contrasted with
the actual rankings. The ¯rst three columns give the ¯nal rank, name of the country and points
received. In the fourth column we present the predicted rankings when we control only for
a±nity (the x variables) while in the ¯fth column we also control for song characteristics (the
w variables).18 For 1998, counterfactual rankings from the model that controls only for a±nity
coincide with actual rankings in four out of the top ten countries. For the other six there is a
simple interchange of positions. For example, the second and third positions are reversed in the
predictions from the actual rankings (UK and Malta) and the same is true for the fourth and
¯fth and seventh and eighth. The reshu²ing is even more dramatic when we also control for
song characteristics. Only two out of ten entries (including the winner) remain in their original
positions. The same is true for 2004, where controlling for a±nity changes the position of four
countries. Importantly, it places Yugoslavia instead of the Ukraine as the winner (by a very
narrow margin, it must be noted). Adding song characteristics as control variables reverses
the order of the two countries back to the their actual ranking in the contest. The remaining
17The 1998 contest in particular was a source of some minor controversy. The following quote from Wikipedia
succinctly describes the last stages of the voting process:
With just one country left to vote, it was anyone's guess who was going to prevail, with Israel and
Malta locked in battle on the same points total (or so the scoreboard said - in fact, Spain's vote had
been wrongly tallied and Malta was really one point ahead), and the United Kingdom apparently
nine points behind (really nine behind Malta and eight behind Israel). When FYR Macedonia came
to award the decisive points, Israel were the ¯rst of the three contenders to be mentioned, receiving
eight points. That was enough to knock the UK out of contention for victory, but left plenty of room
for Israel to be overtaken by their principal rival. Next, the ten points went to the UK, nudging them
into what looked like being an extremely °eeting spell in second place, since most of the audience
assumed the twelve points were destined for Malta. Instead, there were gasps as FYR Macedonia
sent the ¯nal points of the evening to fellow Balkan nation Croatia, handing Israel their ¯rst win in
the contest since \Hallelujah" in 1979.
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurovision Song Contest 1998, accessed Feb 2, 2006.]
18We implement the counterfactual by estimating a model with song ¯xed e®ects and the variables we want to
control for. The estimated ¯xed e®ect is our measure of song quality net of the e®ects captured by the control
variables.
23eight countries in the top ten all change positions. The most notable change is the big drop
experienced by the host country, which is a result of the large coe±cient on the HOST variable.
This may be excessive punishment because, as we noted in the discussion above, the host country
may receive more points because it makes it a greater e®ort to make a good showing.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have examined the nature of voting that takes place in the Eurovision song
contest, a festival that o®ers an example of a truly international forum where a country can
express an opinion about another country, free of political or economic considerations. We ¯nd
that the awarding of points to songs goes beyond rewarding a \good" song. As it happens
large di®erences in voting patterns accounting for tastes re°ect some deeper sociological likes
and dislikes among nations that manifest themselves in systematically biased voting. These
systematic biases conceal the di®erent considerations beyond the aesthetic quality of the song
itself that enter the voting preferences of participant countries and are captured by what we
have identi¯ed as a±nity factors, that is variables that measure how each country feels towards
another country. An interesting observation is that the general public exhibits these biases in
their voting pattern in stronger terms than juries of experts. Of course, one could o®er a more
benign interpretation for these apparent biases as re°ecting similarities (di®erences) in tastes,
not necessarily deeper sentiments of likes or dislikes. In any case, we ¯nd that a±nity variables
are quite important in the voting process in terms of both rankings and points awarded. Using
di®erent speci¯cations we are able to test for the presence and importance of other attributes
of the song delivery that go beyond the a±nity variables or objective quality of the song, such
as the order of appearance and the gender of the artist presenting the song and hosting the
competition. These variables are also quite important in explaining voting patterns beyond
pure quality considerations. Our counterfactual rankings that control for a±nity and for song
characteristics indicate that these biases add up to a substantial number of points and have an
important e®ect in the contest's ¯nal outcome.
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